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NOTES AND COMMENTS

custody of a parent the presumption is rebuttable."' 19 Still other courts
make no finding of the parent's fitness or unfitness but award the custody
20
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child,
then making a decision as to what is best for the
case.
In view of the full and complete findings in the principal case by the
trial courts and the discussion and application of the modern American
view of custody controversies between parent and nonparent by the
supreme court, it is hoped that the common law view of the primary right
of a parent to his child (which must prevail unless the parent is shown
to be unsuitable) is now overruled in North Carolina.
FRANCIS 0.

CLARKSON, JR.

Domestic Relations-Divorce-Abandonment as a Defense to Divorce
on the Ground of Two Years Separation
In order to illustrate clearly one problem in North Carolina divorce
law, this hypothetical situation is posed: a married man living in North
Carolina decides that he can no longer live with his wife in harmony,
although she has not been guilty of any misconduct which would be
grounds for divorce. He desires a divorce but his wife is not willing
to give him one. Could this husband separate from his wife for a period
of two years, continue to support her throughout this period, and then
obtain a divorce on the ground of two years separation under G.S.
§ 50-6?1
The legislative history of divorce on the ground of two years separation in North Carolina seems to demonstrate that the legislature intended
to authorize a divorce by either party upon living separate and apart for2
a period of two years irrespective of how the separation came about.
10 Finken v. Porter, 246 Iowa 1345, 1348, 72 N.W.2d 445, 446 (1955).
2
0 Henry v. James, 222 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.2d 285 (1953) ; Prince v. Carrington,

62 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1952) ; Holmes v. Sanders, 243 N.C. 171, 90 S.E.2d 382 (1955).
This has led at least one writer to say, "Moreover, a divorced spouse would do
well not to allow the children to become overly fond of the baby sitter." Note, 7
ARK. L. Rav. 405, 408 (1953).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950) provides: "Marriages may be dissolved and
the parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application of
either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for
two years, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the
State for a period of six months. This section shall be in addition to other acts
and not construed as repealing other laws on the subject of divorce."
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5(4) (1950), originally enacted in 1907, authorizes
divorce upon a separation for a specified period, but the court has held that the
plaintiff had to establish that he was the injured party. Sanderson v. Sanderson,
178 N.C. 339, 100 S.E. 590 (1919). Then in 1931 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950)
authorized divorce on the basis of separation without mentioning that the plaintiff
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The court has not so interpreted G.S. § 50-6. It has held that a party
should not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and that,
therefore, the plaintiff will be denied a divorce if it is established that
he has abandoned the defendant.3
Inasmuch as the court was restricting the broad language used by
the legislature in G.S. § 50-6 when it held that a plaintiff who abandoned
a defendant would be denied his divorce, would it not have been reasonable to assume that "the-court would require the abandonment to be
criminal in nature ?4 The earlier cases of Hyder v. Hyder and Byers
v. Byers indicated that the court did mean criminal abandonment, but
the more recent case of Pruettv. Pruett indicates that something short
of criminal abandonment will suffice.
The question in the Hyder case was whether the jury had been
properly instructed as to the elements of criminal abandonment. The
court held that the charge was correct and the divorce was properly
denied because the defendant had abandoned the plaintiff in the criminal
sense and that he could not take advantage of his own criminal misconduct. This case clearly indicates that anything short of criminal
abandonment would not have been a defense, since otherwise there would
have been no need for the supreme court to consider the correctness of
the lower court's charge as to criminal abandonment. It would have
been much easier to state that any abandonment would be a valid defense.
had to be the injured party. This tends to indicate that the legislature desired
to authorize the divorce irrespective of how separation came about.
This 1931 statute provided, in part, that there could be a divorce on the application of either party if there had been a separation of husband and wife, whether under deed of separation or otherwise, and they had lived separate and apart for a
specified period. Our court, relying upon the words "under deed of separation or
otherwise," held that the separation had to be by mutual consent. Parker v.
Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936).
In 1937 the statute was amended so that the phrase "either under deed of separation or otherwise" was taken out and only the words "living separate and apart for
two years" were left. Thus it would appear again that by taking out of the
statute the words causing the court to hold that the separation had to be by
mutual consent, the legislature intended to authorize the divorce irrespective of how
separation came about.
' Parker v. Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds,
208 N.C. 428, 181 S.E. 338 (1935). The effect of this interpretation of G.S. § 50-6
and its amendments seems to be to shift the burden from the plaintiff to the defendant to show that the plaintiff is or is not the injured party. If the legislature
had intended this it would have been much simpler to amend G.S. § 50-5 (4) to add
that the burden is on the defendant to establish that the plaintiff is not the injured
party.
'N.C. GEr. STAT. § 14-32 (Supp. 1957) provides that the two requisites for
criminal abandonment are a willful abandonment and a willful failure to provide
adequate support.
215 N.C. 239, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939).
m222
N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).
7247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).
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The Byers case also implies that criminal abandonment is required.
The court, citing the Hyder case, said:
[A] husband is not compelled to live with his wife if he provides
her adequate support. It must, therefore, be conceded that the
law under review does not contemplate, as essential to an effectual
marital obligaseparation under the statute, a repudiation of all
tions, which, of itself, would destroy his remedy.8
These two cases would indicate that the husband, in the facts supposed at the beginning of this Note, could get his divorce since he has
continued to support his wife and is not guilty of criminal abandonment.
The more recent Pruett case indicates, however, that the husband
in the supposed situation could not get a divorce, and that a mere separation of the husband from his wife without just cause is sufficient to
defeat a divorce. In the Pruett case, the husband filed for divorce on
the ground of two years separation. The wife filed a cross-action for
divorce from bed and board. The jury found that the husband had
willfully abandoned the wife and failed to provide her with adequate
support and granted her a divorce from bed and board. Subsequently,
the case was calendared as an uncontested divorce action, and the court
granted the husband an absolute divorce without being aware of the
fact that the wife had already been granted a divorce from bed and
board in the same action. Thereafter the husband moved to have the
divorce from bed and board set aside because, among other things, the
wife had failed to allege that the failure to support had existed to her
knowledge for at least six months prior to the filing of her pleadings.
The court refused to set aside the divorce from bed and board (but did
affirm the setting aside of the husband's absolute divorce because it had
been granted in the same action in which the divorce from bed and board
had been granted), stating that abandonment without a failure to support is sufficient to sustain a divorce from bed and board under G.S.
§ 50-7(1). ° Had the court stopped at this point, the rules set out above
as being supported by Hyder and Byers would not have been affected.
But, the court went on to say that the jury finding of abandonment by
the husband "defeated the plaintiff's action on the ground of such separation."'1 Since the court had said that the abandonment involved did not
8 222 N.C. at 304, 22 S.E.2d at 906.
'N.C. GEN. ST4 T. § 50-7 (1950) provides that a divorce from bed and board
may be granted "if either party abandons his or her family." There is no doubt,
from this wording,' that the legislature intended to authorize a divorce from bed
and board on the ground of abandonment without regard to a failure to support.
This does not, however, appear to indicate that abandonment in this sense was
intended to be sufficient to defeat an absolute divorce on the ground of two years
separation. It is generally held that a ground for limited divorce is not a recriminatory defense to a ground for absolute divorce. MADDEN, PaERSONS AND Do msnc
RELATIo is § 91 (1931).

10 247 N.C. at 23, 100 S.E.2d at 303.
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include a failure to support, the intimation is clear that the court considers abandonment without a failure to support to be sufficient to defeat
a divorce on the ground of two years separation. This appears to be
an unfortunate extension of the Hyder and Byers rules, which limited
the abandonment that will defeat a divorce on the ground of two years
separation to criminal abandonment.
The policy of granting a divorce upon the ground of living separate
and apart seems to be that it is to the best interests of society and the
parties, where the marriage has factually ceased to exist and there is no
intention to resume it, to put an end to it legally. The number of
jurisdictions which have this provision has grown rapidly in recent
years. 1 In some states relief is denied the petitioner on account of his
wrongdoing, 12 but in several jurisdictions fault is not decisive.13
Arkansas has affirmed a decree in favor of a husband although he was
alleged to be a deserter living in open adultery. 14 Apparently there is
a growing conviction in the United States that a marriage which has
ceased to exist as a fact does more harm than a divorce. 15
It is to be hoped that future decisions will settle the interpretation
to be given G.S. § 50-6. In view of the growing liberalization throughout the country and the already liberal wording of the statute, it is
submitted that nothing short of misconduct in the criminal sense should
be allowed to defeat an action for divorce under this section.10
M. HENLEY, JR.
§ 455 (3d ed., Moreland 1946). Nineteen
JESSE

KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico make living apart for a specified
period without cohabitation cause for divorce. Of these 21 jurisdictions, 6 have
statutes as broadly drawn as North Carolina. They are Arizona, Arkansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, and Texas.
'2 Gee v. Gee, 249 Ala. 642, 32 So. 2d 657 (1947) ; Campbell v. Campbell, 174
Md. 229, 198 AtI. 414 (1938) ; West v. West, 115 Vt. 458, 63 A.2d 864 (1949)
Powless v. Powless, 269 Wis. 552, 69 N.W.2d 753 (1955).
1" Cotton v. Cotton, 306 Ky. 826, 209 S.W.2d 474 (1948) ; Otis v. Bahan, 209
La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946). See Annot., 152 A.L.R. 336 (1944).
v. Young, 207 Ark. 36, 178 S.W.2d 994 (1944).
"Young
' 5 KEEzER, op. cit. supra note 10 § 455.
16 Either husband or wife may get a divorce two years after a divorce from
bed and board or two years after a separation agreement, for a separation coupled
with continued support under either of these circumstances is legal. Cameron v.
Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952). Why should there be a distinction
drawn between these "legal separations" and the one supposed at the beginning
of this Note, insofar as the husband's right to obtain divorce is concerned?
The answer to this is a practical one. In the cases first put the wife isprobably
getting alimony and such alimony will survive a divorce decree, while in the latter
situation the wife cannot be awarded alimony incident to an absolute divorce. The
court seems to be trying to protect the wife's right to alimony in the face of
North Carolina's rule as to no alimony as an incident to an absolute divorce. See
Note, 31 N.C.L. REv. 482 (1953), for a discussion of this point.

